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WAIVER OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
TESTIFY: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Although the Constitution does not explicitly grant a criminal defend-
ant a right to testify on his own behalf, the Supreme Court expressly
held, in 1987, that such a right does exist.' Since this decision, federal
courts have disagreed over how a criminal defendant waives his constitu-
tional right to testify.2 All the federal appellate courts addressing this
issue have held that the right to testify is a personal and fundamental
constitutional right.3 Furthermore, all agree that only a "knowing, vol-
untary and intelligent"4 waiver by the defendant himself5 is sufficient to
relinquish this right.6 The courts, however, differ in their application of
this standard.
Under one approach to the waiver of the criminal defendant's constitu-
tional right to testify-the silent record approach-an appellate court
looks only to the trial record to determine if there was a valid waiver of
this right. If the defendant fails to make an on-the-record objection to
not being called to testify, he is considered to have implicitly waived his
1. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987); infra notes 36-40 and accompa-
nying text.
2. See United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752, 758 (11th Cir. 1990); Galowski v.
Murphy, 891 F.2d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 756
(9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1987).
3. See Teague, 908 F.2d at 758; Galowski, 891 F.2d at 636; Martinez, 883 F.2d at
756; Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 751.
4. Courts use different terminology for the constitutional standard for waiver of
rights where the waiver requires the personal consent of the defendant. Compare,
Teague, 908 F.2d at 759 (waiver must be "knowing, voluntary and intelligent") and Mar-
tinez, 883 F.2d at 756 (waiver must be knowing and intentional). The Supreme Court has
also used different language to describe the constitutional standard for waiver. See, eg.,
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (defendant must voluntarily exercise his
own free will and must knowingly and intelligently relinquish the right); Boykin v. Ala-
bama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (waiver needs "an affirmative showing that it was intelli-
gent and voluntary"); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (a waiver is an
"intentional relinquishment" of a "known right"). To summarize, for there to be an
effective waiver under this standard (i) the defendant must know of the right's existence,
ii) the defendant's choice to waive it must be voluntarily made and not coerced, (iii) the
defendant must intelligently waive the right-he must be competent and aware of what
he is doing, and (iv) there must be an intentional waiver-a conscious, informed choice.
See People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117, 121-22 (Colo. 1986). For purposes of this Note, this
standard is "knowing, voluntary and intelligent" unless referred to otherwise by a case
under discussion.
5. The right to testify is deemed so fundamental a constitutional right that the de-
fendant only may waive it. See Teague, 908 F.2d at 759; Galowski, 891 F.2d at 636;
Martinez, 883 F.2d at 756; Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 751; note 42 infra and accompanying
text.
6. See United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752, 758 (1 1th Cir. 1990); Galowski v. Mur-
phy, 891 F.2d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 756 (9th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1987).
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right to testify.7
Under another approach to waiver of the right to testify, the absence
of an on-the-record objection is not considered dispositive on the issue of
whether a defendant has waived his right to testify.8 Rather, appellate
courts employ a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the defend-
ant intended to waive the right.9
Determining how a criminal defendant waives his right to testify is
important, not only for defendants whose constitutional right to testify
may be violated-thus depriving them of a fair trial-but also for counsel
and judges. A clear and consistent test for waiver must be formulated so
that counsel can properly apprise his client of this right and so that
judges can take steps to safeguard the right and determine whether it has
been violated.
This Note examines various approaches to the waiver of the constitu-
tional right to testify in a criminal proceeding and recommends the crea-
tion of a procedure by which trial courts may affirmatively safeguard this
right. Part I gives an historical overview of the development of the right
to testify. Part II explores various approaches to the waiver of the right
to testify by examining the principal federal decisions that have deter-
mined whether a defendant waived his right to testify. Part III analyzes
these approaches in light of Supreme Court precedent and fairness and
autonomy considerations. This section concludes that the silent record
approach to the waiver of the constitutional right to testify is not only
contrary to Supreme Court precedent, but also antithetical to considera-
tions of fairness and autonomy. This section recommends that, at a min-
imum, a case-by-case approach should be adopted by courts. Part IV
recommends that the trial court procedurally safeguard the right to tes-
tify by engaging in a two-part dialogue with the criminal defendant. The
first part of this dialogue informs the defendant of his right to testify.
The second part is a colloquy between the defendant and the court, dur-
ing which the court determines whether there has been a knowing, volun-
tary and intelligent waiver of the right to testify.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO TESTIFY
A. Origins
The right of a defendant to be heard during a criminal proceeding
against him is firmly entrenched in Anglo-American legal tradition. The
right to be heard is found in the Anglo-Saxon "wager of law," whose
7. See Martinez, 883 F.2d at 760; Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 751-52.
8. See Teague, 908 F.2d at 759; Galowski, 891 F.2d at 636; accord United States v.
Vargas, 920 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1990) ("We regard as highly questionable... that a
defendant's failure to object at trial to counsel's refusal to allow him to take the stand
constitutes a waiver of the defendant's constitutional right to testify on his own behalf.").
9. See Teague, 908 F.2d at 761; Galowski, 891 F.2d at 636.
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origin Thayer traced to the fifth century. 10 At this form of trial, the
accused offered proof by swearing his innocence under oath." His oath
was supported by compurgators, who swore that they believed the de-
fendant would swear truthfully, not that they knew the defendant's oath
to be true. 2 Wager of law was a great favorite in local courts13 and
continued to be used in criminal trials at least until the mid-fifteenth
century. 14
Trial by jury was the dominant mode of criminal trial from the medie-
val period forward. During the nascency of this form of trial, neither
witnesses nor counsel were allowed for either the prosecution or the de-
fendant.Is Rather, a self-informed jury acting under oath decided ques-
tions of guilt and innocence.' 6
From the very beginning of jury trial, however, the defendant spoke
during proceeding. 7 In fact, initially, the only voices heard during trial
were those of the presiding jurist and the defendant." Although not
under oath, the defendant was asked questions by the jurist and was al-
lowed to make an exculpatory statement to the jury. 9 The defendant's
in-court statements were the focal point of the medieval criminal trial.2°
Similarly, in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in England,
a defendant in a criminal trial, while not sworn and allowed neither wit-
nesses nor counsel,21 was expected to respond to witnesses presented
against him and was questioned during trial.' Beginning in the middle
of the seventeenth century, the accused was gradually allowed to call
witnesses.' Then, in 1701, the defendant was given, by statute, the right
to have witnesses testify under oath on his behalf.24 The defendant him-
10. See J. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 25
(1898).
11. See id. at 24-25 (1898).
12. See id, at 25.
13. See id.
14. See id at 26.
15. See T.A. Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English




19. Id; see also Powell, Jury Trial at Gaol Delivery in the Late Middle Ages, in Twelve
Good Men and True: The Criminal Trial Jury in England, 1200-1800 106 (1988)(during
the fifteenth century the primary source of evidence was the defendant himself and the
"plausibility of [the defendant's] denials, as well as [his] general demeanor, must have
weighed heavily with the jury").
20. See Green, supra note 15, at 137.
21. See I J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 350, 440 (1883); 2
Wigmore, Evidence, § 575 at 684-86 (1940); Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the
Lawyers, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 307-09 (1978); Popper, History and Development of the
Accused's Right to Testify, 1962 Wash. U.L.Q. 454, 455.
22. See Stephen, supra note 21, at 440; Wigmore supra note 21, at 684; Langbein,
supra note 21, at 285, 311.
23. See Wigmore, supra note 21, at 685-86 and n.46; Popper, supra note 21, at 455-56.
24. See An Act for Punishing of Accessories to Felonies and Receivers of Stolen
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self, however, was deemed incompetent to give sworn testimony.25 Nev-
ertheless, he was expected to respond to the evidence against him and his
responses were accorded evidentiary weight.26
The practice of disqualifying a defendant from testifying under oath
was inherited by American courts. By the mid 1800s, however, this
practice was much criticized.27 In 1864, Maine adopted a statute estab-
Goods, and to Prevent the Wilful Burning and Destroying of Ships, 1 Anne, St. 2, c.9
(1701).
25. See Stephen, supra note 21, at 440; Wigmore, supra note 21, at 684; Popper, supra
note 21, at 456; Note, Due Process v. Defense Counsel's Unilateral Waiver of the Defend-
ant's Right to Testify, 3 Hastings Const. L.Q. 517, 520 (1976) [hereinafter, Note, Due
Process]. The practice of disqualifying a criminal defendant from testifying under oath
was borrowed from civil common law where all parties with an interest in the outcome of
a litigation were disqualified from testifying. See Stephen, supra note 21, at 440; Wig-
more, supra note 21, at 685-86. The disqualification was based largely on the fear that a
party with an interest in the outcome of a litigation would testify falsely. See Wigmore,
supra note 21, at 686.
In most felony cases, however, defendants were without counsel and thus acted as sole
advocate on their own behalf. See D. Phillips, Crime and Authority in Victorian Eng-
land: The Black Country 1835-1860 104 (1977); Stephen, supra note 21, at 440. Until
1836, even if represented by counsel the defendant was still expected to make an exculpa-
tory statement before the court. See id. Thus, although incompetent to testify formally
under oath, a defendant retained the right to speak in his defense. See Stephen, supra
note 21, at 440-41; Wigmore, supra note 21, at 684; J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in
England: 1660-1800 348-49 (1986); see also Langbein, supra note 21, at 283 (At the Old
Bailey, "[s]o long as [the defendant] was without counsel there was scarcely any possibil-
ity of distinguishing the accused's role as defender and as witness. Throughout the period
• .. *it was expected the he would reply to any evidence adduced against him that lay
within his knowledge."). In fact, the defendant's "mouth was not only open, but the
evidence given against him operated as so much indirect questioning, [that] if he omitted
to answer the questions it suggested he was very likely to be convicted." Stephen, supra
note 21, at 440. Thus, through self-representation, the defendant presented "evidence"
even though he was not a qualified witness. See Wigmore, supra note 21, at 684; Beattie,
supra, at 348.
26. See Stephen, supra note 21, at 440; Wigmore, supra note 21, at 684; see also Beat-
tie, supra note 25, at 349 (when the defendant spoke, his statements were given great
weight). But see United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1989)(unsup-
ported assertion that English courts did not give evidentiary weight to a defendant's
testimony).
27. Jeremy Bentham, the British legal reformer, led the fight for competency in Eng-
land. One of his devotees, John Appleton, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Maine,
led the fight for competency of both civil and criminal parties in the United States. See
Popper, supra note 21, at 460. Appleton criticized the practice of disqualifying criminal
defendants from testifying as being a hinderance to prosecution and benefit to the ac-
cused: "When [a] deficiency of evidence is the result of exclusionary rules, the law aids
and abets the criminal. It does on a grand, what the pejured withholder of facts does, on
a small scale." Popper, supra note 21, at 461 (quoting Appleton, Evidence 120 (1860)).
Such reform, however, met with resistance from those who feared pejury would result:
The proposal to make the prisoner a competent witness has an appearance of
system about it .... but there are strong objections to it. In the first place the
prisoner could never be a real witness; it is not in human nature to speak the
truth under such a pressure as would be brought to bear on the prisoner, and it




lishing testimonial competency for criminal defendants.' By the turn of
the century the federal government and all but one state had followed
suit.29
B. Recent Developments
After the enactment of statutes granting competency to criminal de-
fendants to testify on their own behalf, but before courts recognized a
constitutional right to testify, the decision to testify was considered a
matter of trial strategy.30 Consequently, the right to testify could be uni-
laterally waived by defense counsel3" and appeals based on right-to-tes-
tify claims were limited to competency-of-counsel issues.3 2 Beginning in
1948, however, the Supreme Court indicated that the right to testify was
constitutionally protected.33 In the late 1970s, subsequent to Judge
Popper, supra note 21, at 458-59 (quoting Stephen, A General View of the Criminal Law
of England 201-02 (1863)).
Others believed competency would be hurtful to the defendant because the jury would
draw a negative inference from a defendant's failure to testify. See Popper, supra note 21,
at 459; Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 578-79 (1961). This prediction proved accu-
rate; today, juries have a strong tendency to infer guilt from a defendant's failure to take
the stand. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
28. Me. Pub. Laws 1864, ch. 280 (cited in Popper, supra note 21, at 463 n.47).
29. See Popper, supra note 21, at 463-64; Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577.
30. See Hammerman, A Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Right to Testify-The
Implications of United States Ex Ret Wilcox v. Johnson, 23 Vil. L. Rev. 678, 686 (1977);
Note, Due Process, supra note 25, at 529; United States v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156, 1161
(10th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1036 (1984); Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661, 664 (7th
Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S. 943 (1969), overruled in pertinent part, Alicea v. Gagnon, 675
F.2d 913, 923 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795, 797 (2d Cir.
1963); Newsom v. Smyth, 261 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir. 1958), cer denied, 359 U.S. 969
(1959). But see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) ("the accused has the ultimate
authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, [including] whether
to ... testify in his or her own behalf"); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1, 94
(1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (although trial decisions are a matter of trial strategy,
the decisions of "whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, or testify in one's own behalf"
ultimately rest with the accused).
31. See Hammerman, supra note 30, at 685; Note, Due Process, supra note 25, at 529;
Sims, 411 F.2d at 664; Garguilo, 324 F.2d at 797; Newsom, 261 F.2d at 454.
32. See Hammerman, supra note 30, at 686; Note, Due Process, supra note 25, at 529;
Sims, 411 F.2d at 665; Garguilo, 324 F.2d at 797; Newsom, 261 F.2d at 454.
33. See, eg., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (the Court, in dicta, noted that a
"person's right... to offer testimony" was one of the components of an accused's right to
defend); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 602 (1961) (Justice Clark, concurring,
strongly urged recognition of a defendant's right to testify based on the due process
clause); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) Cin dicta, the Court stated that
"[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do
so"); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972) (in dicta, the court stated "[w]hether
the defendant is to testify is an important tactical decision as well as a matter of constitu-
tional right"); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 n. 15 (1975) (the Court recognized
a right to testify based on the due process clause); See also United States v. Bifield, 702
F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir.), cerit denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983) (holding there is a constitu-
tional right to testify); Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 923 (7th Cir. 1982) (same); Poe v.
United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (same).
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Godbold's eloquent dissent in Wright v. Estelle,34 courts began to hold
that the criminal defendant's right to testify was a constitutionally pro-
tected right and so substantial that its waiver required the personal con-
sent of the defendant. 5
Then, in the 1987 case, Rock v. Arkansas,36 the Supreme Court held
that a criminal defendant had a constitutional right to testify on his own
behalf.37 The Court located this right in several constitutional sources.
First, the Court found it a "necessary ingredientfl" of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, noting that "(lt is one of the rights that
[is] 'essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process.' "38 Next,
the Court cited the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment,
stating that the right to testify is "[e]ven more fundamental to a personal
defense than the right of self-representation. ' 39 The Court then located
the right in the fifth amendment as "a necessary corollary to the...
guarantee against compelled testimony."'
Federal courts after Rock have determined the right to testify to be a
personal and fundamental right4' that is so fundamental in nature that its
waiver must be effected knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently by the
defendant himself.42 As a result, the decision of whether to have the
34. 572 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978).
35. See United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1064 (1986); United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 347-49 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
461 U.S. 931 (1983).
36. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
37. See id. at 49. The issue in Rock was whether Arkansas' per se rule of excluding a
defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony was constitutional. The Court found that
Arkansas' over-broad exclusion of testimony violated an accused's constitutional right to
testify. See id. at 62.
38. Id. at 51 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975)).
39. Id, at 52.
40. Id.
41. See United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752, 758 (11th Cir. 1990); Galowski v.
Murphy, 891 F.2d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 756
(9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1987).
42. See Teague, 908 F.2d at 759; Galowski, 891 F.2d at 636; Martinez, 883 F.2d at
756; Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 751. Although the validity of such determination is outside
the scope of this Note, it is presumed, for purposes of this Note, that the right to testify is
a constitutional right so fundamental to the criminal defendant that its waiver requires
the personal consent of the defendant. Such presumption is based on the historical im-
portance of the criminal defendant's rights to testify and be heard at trial, see supra notes
10-28 and accompanying text, decisions prior to Rock finding the waiver of the right to
testify to require the defendant's personal consent, see United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d
1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1064 (1986); United States v. Bifield, 702
F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); United States v. Butts, 630 F.
Supp. 1145, 1147-48 (D. Me. 1986), Supreme Court recognition that the decision of
whether to testify is for the accused to make and not a matter of trial strategy, see Jones
v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.l
(1977)(Burger, C. J., concurring), American Bar Association Standards recognizing that
the ultimate decision of whether to testify belongs to the accused and not counsel, see
Standards for Criminal Justice, Vol. I, § 4-5.2. at 4-65 to -67 (2d ed. 1986 Supp.) (herein-
after Standards for Criminal Justice], and recognition in commentary that the right to
testify is no longer a "trial-type" right but rather may only be waived by the defendant.
[Vol. 60
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criminal defendant testify was removed from the sphere of trial tactics
and strategy.4' Additionally, defense counsel could no longer unilaterally
waive the right to testify." Consequently, courts now must develop
strategies to safeguard this right and develop approaches to determine
whether the right has been violated.
II. DIFFERING APPROACHES TO WAIVER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT To TE FY
Thus far, four federal circuits have examined the issue of whether a
criminal defendant has personally waived his constitutional right to tes-
tify. Two have employed a silent record approach. The other two have
adopted a case-by-case approach.
A. Silent Record Waiver
Under the silent record approach, a defendant is deemed to have
waived his right to testify if he does not make an on-the-record objection
in response to his not being called to testify. The Eighth Circuit, in
United States v. Bernloehr,45 was the first federal court of appeals to em-
ploy this approach."
During trial, the defendant in Bernloehr wanted to testify on his own
See Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsek Old Roads; New Paths--a Dead
End?, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 9, 31 n.123 (1986); Hammerman, supra note 30, at 684-85;
O'Neill, Vindicating the Defendant's Constitutional Right to Testify at a Criminal Trial
The Need for an on-the-Record Waiver, 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 809, 823-26 (1990); Rieger,
Client Perury: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional and Ethical Issues, 70 Minn.
L. Rev. 121, 142 n. 117 (1985); Note, Due Process, supra note 25, at 527-29; see also Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2(a)(1989)[hereinafter Model Rules](attorney shall
abide by client's decision on whether to testify).
43. See O'Neill, supra note 42, at 821-26; Rieger, supra note 42, at 142 n. 117; Note,
Due Process, supra note 25, at 529-32; Teague, 908 F.2d at 759; Galowski 891 F.2d at 636;
Curtis, 742 F.2d at 1076; see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, (1983)(defendant
has ultimate authority to decide whether to testify); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93
n.1 (1977) (Burger, CJ., concurring)(whether to testify is not a matter of trial strategy);
Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 42, standard 4-5.2. at 4-65 to -66, commentary
at 4-67 to -69 (whether to testify is for defendant to decide and not a matter of trial
strategy).
44. See Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 42, standard 4-5.2. at 4-65 to -66,
and commentary at 4-67 to -69; Hammerman, supra note 30, at 684-85; O'Neill, supra
note 42, at 821-22; Note, Due Process, supra note 25, at 529-32; United States v. Teague,
908 F.2d 752, 759 (11th Cir. 1990); Galowski v. Murphy, 891 F.2d 629, 636 (7th Cir.
1990); Curtis, 742 F.2d at 1076.
45. 833 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1987).
46. Prior to Bernloehr, a number of federal appellate courts decisions held that a
criminal defendant had a constitutional right to testify. None, however, reached the
question of how a defendant waives this right. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d
1070, 1075 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1064 (1986)(constitutional right to
testify does not include right to testify perjuriously); United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d
342, 350 (2d Cir. 1983)(defendant's constitutional right to testify does not include right to
testify on inadmissible evidence); Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1982)(de-
fendant has constitutional right to testify, but it was harmless error that he was denied it).
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
behalf. His attorney, however, wanted to keep him off the stand.47
When presenting the defense, the defense attorney advised the judge of
their disagreement.4" Shortly thereafter, the defense rested without call-
ing the defendant to the stand. 9 The defendant claimed on appeal that
his right to testify had been violated when, against his will, his attorney
prevented him from taking the stand. 0
In a brief opinion citing Rock v. Arkansas, the court found the right to
testify to be a personal and fundamental constitutional right. Addition-
ally, the court found that this right could be waived only by the defend-
ant and that its waiver had to be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
effected. 51 The court, however, erroneously relying on a pre-Rock, appel-
late court decision that based its holding on the statutory grant of the
right to testify, and not the constitutional right to testify,52 stated that
"'[t]he accused must act affirmatively'" at the time of trial to preserve
his right to testify.5" The court reasoned that, because "[n]othing in the
record support[ed] ... a claim" that the defendant's will to testify was
overcome by his counsel, he had effectively waived his right to testify. 4
At one point, the court appeared to limit its holding to "sophisticated"
criminal defendants who should have known to object when the defense
47. See Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 750-751.
48. See id. at 750. The defense attorney approached the bench and, out of the hearing
of his client, stated: "'Your Honor, I'm somewhat in a dilemma, my client wants to
testify and I don't want to have him testify. He has announced to the court that he is
going to testify, he is willing to accede to my advise that we rest at this point.'" Id.
49. See id.
50. See id at 751.
51. See id
52. See United States v. Systems Architects, Inc., 757 F.2d 373, 375 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985). Under jurisprudence concerning the waiver of the statutory
right to testify, defense counsel could unilaterally waive a defendant's right to testify. See
supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
53. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 752 (quoting Systems Architects, 757 F.2d at 375). Systems
Architects also states: "18 U.S.C. § 3481 does provide for testimony by the accused: '...
the person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness.'" Systems Archi-
tects, 757 F.2d at 375 (emphasis in original). The Systems Architects court gave only a
cursory glance at possible constitutional implications, stating the "due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment may... grant [to] the accused the right to testify." Id. (emphasis
added). The basis for the Systems Architects' decision, however, is that the right to testify
is merely a statutory privilege. See id. Thus, the Bernloehr court mixed apples and or-
anges when it relied on Systems Architects.
Furthermore, although the court in Systems Architects does not expressly set forth
what kind of 'affirmative action' is necessary for a defendant to secure his statutory right
to testify, the court indicates that all the defendant need do is inform his attorney of his
desire to testify: "the instant case is not a situation where the [defendant] wanted to
testify and [was] prevented from doing so by the trial court or counsel." Id. Thus, the
Systems Architects court implies that there may be a violation of the statutory right to
testify if the defendant, after requesting to do so, was denied the opportunity to testify.
Therefore, the court in Bernloehr not only erroneously relied on a case which solely
interpreted the statutory right to testify, but also misinterpreted what that case meant by
"acting affirmatively" to secure the statutory right to testify.
54. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 752.
[Vol. 60
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rested without calling the defendant to testify." Later in the opinion,
however, the court indicated that its holding could be construed to cover
all defendants, whether sophisticated or not.56 Unfortunately, the court
did not clarify this aspect of its decision."
The Ninth Circuit, however, expressly held that any criminal defend-
ant waives his constitutional right to testify by merely failing to make an
on-the-record objection to his not being called to testify.5" In United
States v. Martinez, the defendant expressed his desire to testify before
trial," when the prosecution rested' and again, immediately after the
defense rested.61 His attorney, however, not only refused to place him on
the stand,62 but also made a veiled threat that he would withdraw from
the case if the defendant went on the witness stand.' On appeal, the
defendant alleged, based on his repeated requests to testify throughout
55. The court noted that the defendant, "an apparently mature and sophisticated bus-
inessman, represented by able and experienced counsel, made no objection when his
counsel rested without calling [him] to the stand." Id. at 751-52. Here, the court echoed
language of the Systems Architects' holding on the waiver of jury trial. The Systems Ar-
chitects court held that because the defendants were "well-educated owners and manag-
ers" of a company dealing with sophisticated computer systems, they were competent to
voluntarily and knowingly waive their right to a jury trial. Systems Architects, 757 F.2d
at 375. The Systems Architects court thus held that, based on written, signed waivers and
colloquies with the trial judge, the defendants had waived their right to a jury trial. See
hi
56. "The defendant may not... indicate at trial his apparent acquiescence in his
counsel's advice that he not testify, and then later claim that his will to testify was 'over-
come."' United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 1987).
57. See id! at 751-52.
58. See United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 758-60 (9th Cir. 1989).
59. See id at 752.
60. See i.
61. Immediately after the defense rested, "Martinez urged [his attorney] to move for
a recess so that he could again try to persuade him that he should be allowed to testify."
Id. at 761 n.1 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
62. As the attorney later testified in an evidentiary hearing: "I just made the decision
he was not going to testify, I refused to call him and that was the way it went down." Id.
at 761 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
63. "'[I]mplicit in what I told [the defendant] was that implied threat, [to withdraw
from the case if the defendant testified]."' Id at 752 (quoting post-conviction hearing
testimony of the defense attorney). Forcing the defendant to choose between proceeding
with counsel or asserting his right to testify has been found to be a violation of the right
to testify. See Nichols v. Butler, 917 F.2d 518, 521 (11th Cir. 1990). In Nichols, as in
Martinez, counsel for the defendant threatened to withdraw from the case if the defend-
ant testified. See id at 520. The court found that because the attorney placed the defend-
ant in a position where he had to make a choice between two fundamental constitutional
rights-the right to assistance of counsel and the right to testify-the case "present[ed] a
clearer example of a violation of the defendant's right to testify than that presented in
Teague." Id at 521; see also United States v. Scott, 909 F.2d 488, 493 (11th Cir.
1990)(trial judge's forcing defendant to choose between right to testify and right to coun-
sel is a violation of defendant's constitutional rights); United States ex reL Wilcox v.
Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120-22 (3d Cir. 1977)(same). Such coercion violates the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice: "Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are
ultimately for the accused [,including the decision of] whether to testify in his or her own
behalf." Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 42, Standard 4-5.2. at 4-65; see also
Model Rules, supra note 42, at Rule 1.2(a).
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the course of the trial and his attorney's categorical refusal to place him
on the stand, that he did not intentionally waive his right to testify. 64
The Martinez court unanimously agreed that a defendant in a criminal
trial has a personal and fundamental constitutional right to testify on his
own behalf.65 Further, the court held that the defendant alone could
waive this right and that the waiver had to be knowingly and intention-
ally effected.6 A divided panel, however, held that because the defend-
ant did not object on the record to his not being called to testify, he had
waived his right to testify.67
Thus, under the silent record approach to waiver of a criminal defend-
ant's right to testify, a reviewing court does not look to the facts of an
individual case but looks only to the record to determine whether a de-
fendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to tes-
tify. Thus, if the defendant makes no objection to his not being called to
testify, he is deemed to have waived this right.
B. The Case-by-Case Approach
Under the case-by-case approach, a reviewing court examines the facts
of a given case to determine whether a criminal defendant has waived his
right to testify. 68 The Eleventh Circuit, for example, employed this ap-
proach in United States v. Teague,69 a case factually similar to Martinez,
64. See Martinez, 883 F.2d at 756.
65. See United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 1989); id. at 762 (Rein-
hardt, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 756.
67. See id. at 760. While Martinez was decided in 1989, on rehearing the panel re-
versed the conviction on other grounds and vacated the published opinion on April 9,
1990. See United States v. Martinez, 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991). While this belated
action by the Ninth Circuit robs the earlier decision of its precedential impact, nonethe-
less, subsequent decisions by the Ninth and other Circuits have relied on the rationale
and analytic framework of the Martinez panel's decision. See United States v. Edwards,
897 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 560 (1990).
68. See, eg., United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752, 759-60 (1 lth Cir. 1990)(post-
conviction hearing was basis for finding defendant's right to testify was violated); Galow-
ski v. Murphy, 891 F.2d 629, 636-37 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1953
(1990)(post-conviction hearing was basis for determining that defendant's right to testify
was not violated); United States v. DiSalvo, 726 F. Supp. 596, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1989)(post-
conviction hearing was basis for finding defendant's right to testify was violated); United
States v. Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145, 1148-49 (D. Me. 1986)(same).
69. 908 F.2d 752 (lth Cir. 1990). Although Teague was the first federal court of
appeals case to find that a defendant's right to testify had been violated by his attorney,
prior decisions by two district courts also differed with the Martinez analysis. In United
States v. Butts, the court, on facts similar to Martinez, ordered a new trial for the defend-
ant, finding that the defendant's right to testify had been violated. See 630 F. Supp. at
1148-49.
In United States v. Disalvo, the government, on the basis of the Martinez holding, made
a motion for reconsideration of a judge's prior holding that a defendant's right to testify
had been violated. See 726 F. Supp. at 597. The court, however, expressly rejected Mar-
tinez even though the facts were similar, and implicitly rejected the silent record ap-
proach of Martinez by stating, "[t]o the extent that the majority in Martinez is to be
understood as holding that a defense attorney's decision not to call the defendant to the
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in reaching an opposite conclusion.
The defendant in Teague, like the defendant in Martinez, expressed his
desire to testify both before and during trial, including immediately after
the defense rested.7" As in Martinez, the attorney made a unilateral deci-
sion not to have the defendant testify7 1 and the record was silent as to the
defendant's desire to testify. 72
The Eleventh Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit, held that a defendant's
constitutional right to testify is fundamental and personal and that only
the defendant may waive it.71 Citing Martinez, the court held that a
waiver of this right must be "knowing, voluntary and intelligent. ' 7' The
Eleventh Circuit, however, parted company with Martinez in its interpre-
tation of a silent record. The court found that "the absence of an on the
record objection by the defendant himself is of little, if any, probative
value in determining whether the decision that the defendant would not
testify was the defendant's own decision."" The court noted that "once
a defendant elects to take advantage of his right to counsel, he is told that
all further communications with the court and the prosecutor should be
made through his attorney. ' 76 The court also observed that defendants
who speak out of turn are faced with swift reprimand from the trial court
and face possible discipline.77
Rather than divining waiver from a silent record, the Eleventh Circuit
focused on whether the defendant had in fact made an affirmative know-
ing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to testify. It thus stated
that the right to testify may not be unilaterally waived by counsel against
the will of the defendant, 7 holding that only when "the defendant does
not personally waive the right to testify and defense counsel fails to allow
the defendant to take the stand, [is] the defendant's right to testify...
violated."' 79 The Teague court thus found that the defendant's right to
stand conclusively establishes client-waiver, I disagree for the reasons developed at length
by Judge Reinhardt in his careful dissenting opinion." Id at 598.
70. See Teague, 908 F.2d at 760; United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 752 (9th
Cir. 1989).
71. See Teague, 908 F.2d at 760.
72. See i.
73. See id at 759.
74. Id
75. Id See also United States v. Vargas, 920 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1990)("We re-
gard as highly questionable the proposition that a defendant's failure to object at trial to
counsel's refusal to allow him to take the stand constitutes a waiver of the defendant's
constitutional right to testify on his own behalf."); United States v. DiSalvo, 726 F. Supp.
596, 598 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (rejecting the silent record approach).
76. United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752, 759 (11th Cir. 1990).
77. See id; see also United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 770 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting)(defendant speaking out of turn faces contempt charges). The
Teague court further noted that as the defendant is unskilled in courtroom procedure, he
may not realize until jury deliberations that the time for him to testify is past. See
Teague, 908 F.2d at 759.
78. See id at 757.
79. Id at 761.
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testify had indeed been violated. 0
Like Teague, the Seventh Circuit similarly employed a case-by-case
approach in Galowski v. Murphy."1 The Galowski court also found the
right to testify to be a personal and fundamental constitutional right.82
Noting that an attorney may not unilaterally waive his client's right to
testify, the court held that whether a defendant has waived this right is a
factual question." Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit did not
look to the absence of an on-the-record objection in determining whether
the defendant had waived this right. 4 Rather, it relied on testimony
from a post-conviction hearing in finding that the defendant had, in fact,
made the decision not to take the stand. Consequently, the court found
the, defendant's right to testify had not been violated."
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT, FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS,
DIGNITY AND AUTONOMY CONSIDERATIONS
The two approaches adopted by federal courts of appeal to determine
whether a defendant has waived his right to testify are not reconcilable.
The silent record approach conclusively finds waiver of this right merely
where the defendant has not made an on-the-record objection to his not
being called to testify. The case-by-case approach rejects this implicit
finding of presumptive waiver. Instead, waiver is determined from the
totality of the circumstances of a given case. To determine the proper
approach to waiver of the right to testify, Supreme Court precedent and
other countervailing policy considerations should be investigated.
A. Supreme Court Standards for the Waiver of Fundamental Rights
of Criminal Defendants
In Johnson v. Zerbst, 6 the Supreme Court articulated the standard by
which waivers of constitutionally protected rights are to be measured
where the waiver requires the personal consent of the criminal defendant.
As stated by the Court, "[a] waiver is... an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege."8 " After Zerbst, the
80. See id
81. See Galowski v. Murphy, 891 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1953 (1990).




86. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
87. Id at 464. See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)(defendant
must be voluntarily exercising his own free will and must knowingly and intelligently
relinquish the right to counsel); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)(waiver
needs "an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary"); Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)(reasserting Zerbst standards for waiver of right against
self-incrimination in custodial interrogations); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 512-13
(1962)(defendant must intelligently and understandingly waive fundamental right to
counsel); Adams v. United States ex reL McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277 (1942) (defendant
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Supreme Court has consistently held that a case-by-case factual inquiry
is necessary when determining whether there has been such a waiver.8"
Additionally, the Court has repeatedly rejected the use of a silent record
approach in determining whether a criminal defendant has waived such a
right.89
The silent record approach thus ignores the dictates of Supreme Court
precedent.' Courts employing this approach, to avoid conflict with
Supreme Court holdings, have either side-stepped precedent by resting
their holdings on cases that do not consider the constitutional dimension
of the right to testify9 1 or have disregarded outright the requirement of
case-by-case analysis through invocations of "[c]ustom and common
sense."
92
must be competent to make an intelligent, informed choice of whether to waive a funda-
mental right). For a further explanation of the general requirements of this standard, see
supra note 4.
88. See, eg., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)(waiver depends on
facts of each case); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36 (employing a case-by-case approach to
determine if defendant waived his right to counsel); Carnley, 369 U.S. at 513 (same);
Adams, 317 U.S. at 278 (determination of waiver "depend[s] upon the unique circum-
stances of each case"); Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 (whether there has been a waiver of a
fundamental right "depend[s], in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case").
89. See, eg., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972)("Such an approach, by
presuming waiver of a fundamental right from inaction, is inconsistent with this Court's
pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights.") (footnote omitted); Carnley, 369
U.S. at 516 ("[p]resuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible"); Boykin, 395
U.S. at 242 (holding there must be an on the record showing that guilty plea was made
knowingly and voluntarily); Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 (courts should not "'presume acqui-
escence in the loss of fundamental rights' ")(citation omitted); cf. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373
(mere silence is not enough but prosecutor can prove through course of conduct and an
understanding of right that defendant knowing and intelligently waived right to have
counsel present at custodial interrogation).
90. See United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 768 (9th Cir. 1989) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting). The silent record approach presumes that by not making an on-the-record
objection, a defendant knows he has the right to testify, knows the ultimate decision on
whether to testify is his, is competent to waive the right, makes a conscious choice not to
testify and makes a voluntary, uncoerced decision not to testify. See id.; O'Neill, supra
note 42, at 832-33. Such presumption turns the "basic rule of constitutional construction
on its head." Martinez, 883 F.2d at 768 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); see also O'Neill, supra
note 42, at 829 ("[t]his ... method is totally at odds with the 'knowing and intelligent'
waiver approach").
91. See United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 1987); supra notes 52-
53 and accompanying text.
92. Martinez, 883 F.2d at 756. The Martinez court would impute knowledge of the
constitutional right to testify through "[e]ducat[ion] by television." Id at 761. Notwith-
standing that 'education by television' may be a contradiction in terms, it is extremely
problematic to "stake fundamental constitutional rights on the vagaries of network pro-gramming." Id at 770 n.27 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
The Martinez court further offers three specious analogies to buttress its custom and
common sense argument. First, the court notes that because a defendant waives his right
not to testify by taking the stand, conduct alone is also sufficient to waive the right to
testify. See id at 756-57. Silence and inaction, however, are qualitatively distinct from
such affirmative conduct. See, eg., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)
(recognizing that mere silence is not enough to waive a constitutional right, prosecution
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In contrast, because the case-by-case approach to waiver of the right to
testify employs a case-specific factual inquiry, it is consistent with
Supreme Court precedent concerning waiver of other fundamental
rights.9 3 Moreoever, this approach has proved successful for determin-
ing whether a defendant's right to testify has been violated. For example,
in United States v. Teague,94 the Eleventh Circuit examined the record of
a post-conviction hearing and found that the defendant's right to testify
had been violated because the attorney had unilaterally waived this right
against the defendant's will.9" Similarly, in Galowski v. Murphy,96 the
Seventh Circuit relied upon a post-conviction hearing to determine that
the defendant had personally made the decision not to testify.9 7 There is
thus no persuasive reason to abandon the Supreme Court mandated,
case-by-case approach in determining whether a defendant has given his
personal consent to the waiver of his constitutional right to testify. In
fact, there are other grounds that support the adoption of this approach.
must prove defendant's understanding of the right and a course of conduct to establish
waiver). Additionally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "[p]resuming waiver
from a silent record is impermissible." Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
Thus, this analogy is not compelling reason to abandon Supreme Court precedent on
waivers of fundamental rights.
Next, the Martinez court observed that by the conduct of appearing with counsel, the
defendant is deemed to have waived his right of self-representation, and thus, similarly by
remaining silent a defendant waives the right to testify. See Martinez, 883 F.2d at 757-58.
Appearing with counsel, however, is more than mere silence. It is affirmative conduct.
Furthermore, the right of self-representation "cut[s] against the grain of [Supreme Court]
decisions," as courts consider an attorney's assistance "essential to assure the defendant a
fair trial." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832-33 (1975)(citations and footnote omit-
ted). Thus, the right to self-representation is disfavored by courts. See Martinez, 883
F.2d at 765 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting). The right to testify, however, like the right to
counsel, goes to the very heart of the fairness of a trial. See Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d
1071, 1079 (5th Cir. 1978)(Godbold, J., dissenting). Thus, this analogy does little to
buttress Martinez' "common sense" disregard of Supreme Court precedent.
As a final analogy, the court posited that because a defendant waives his right to cross-
examine witnesses through his attorney, similarly, he waives his right to testify through
his attorney. See Martinez, 883 F.2d at 758-59. The right to cross-examine witnesses,
however, is a matter of trial strategy, ultimately for the attorney to decide. See Standards
for Criminal Justice, supra note 42, Standard 4-5.2(b), at 4-65 to -66, commentary at 4-67
to -68. The decision of whether to testify belongs to the defendant. See Standards for
Criminal Justice, supra note 42, at 4-65, commentary at 4-66 to -67; supra notes 41-44
and accompanying text; see also Model Rules, supra note 42, at Rule 1.2(a) ("the lawyer
shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to ... whether
the client will testify"). Thus the Martinez court offers no compelling evidence from
which to disregard decades of Supreme Court precedent.
93. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
94. 908 F.2d 752 (1lth Cir. 1990).
95. See iL at 760; see also United States v. DiSalvo, 726 F. Supp. 596, 598 (E.D. Pa.
1989)(post-conviction hearing was basis for finding defendant's right to testify had been
violated).
96. 891 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1953 (1990).
97. See id. at 636.
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B. Considerations of Fairness and Autonomy
Fairness and autonomy considerations further support the use of a
case-by-case approach. The perceptions of both the public at-large,98 and
the criminal defendant of a right's importance to a fair trial should be
considered when determining the proper standard for the waiver of a
constitutional right.99 Thus, in Faretta v. California,"° the Supreme
Court conceded that self-representation would work to the detriment of
most defendants,1 'O but nevertheless found it to be unfair to "force a
lawyer on a defendant"' 2 because "[ilt is the defendant himself and not
his lawyer or the State [who] bear[s] the personal consequences of a con-
viction".'03 The Court further stated that a defendant in such a position
"can only ... believe that the law contrives against him.""' Similarly, a
defendant who wishes to testify but is wrongfully denied the opportunity
by his attorney or the court' will likely believe that he has been denied
a fair hearing. 6
The public also must be satisfied that a defendant has not been silenced
by the machinations of his counsel or the court, or through ignorance or
mistake.'07 Indeed, actual unfairness often results when a defendant
does not testify because often the defendant is the most effective witness
for the defense'08 and juries, despite limiting instructions, are highly
prone to infer guilt from criminal defendant's failure to take the stand."°
98. See, eg., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170
(1951)(Frankfirter, J., concurring)("The heart of the matter is that democracy implies
respect for the elementary rights of [people], however suspect or unworthy; a democratic
government must therefore practice fairness; and fairness can rarely be obtained by se-
cret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.")(footnote omitted); Adams v.
United States ex. rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)('It]he public conscience must be
satisfied that fairness dominates the administration of justice").
99. See Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Con-
stitutional Rights, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 120 (1984).
100. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
101. See id, at 834.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. As eloquently stated by Judge Godbold in his dissenting opinion in Wright v.
Estelle:
To deny a defendant the right to tell his story from the stand dehumanizes the
administration of justice. I cannot accept a decision that allows a jury to con-
demn to death or imprisonment a defendant who desires to speak, without ever
having heard the sound of his voice.
Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1078 (5th Cir. 1978)(citation omitted).
105. This was what happened in Martinez. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying
text. The court, however, because it employed a silent record approach found that the
defendant's right to testify had not been violated. See supra note 67 and accompanying
text
106. See Wright, 572 F.2d at 1078-79 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
107. See People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 513-14 (Colo. 1984).
108. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987); see also Green v. United States, 365
U.S. 301, 304 (1961)("[t]he most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a de-
fendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself").
109. See, e.g., McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Evidence 89 (2d ed. 1972) (a
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Thus, forcing a defendant to accept, against his will, his attorney's deci-
sion that he not testify, smacks of the unfairness the case-by-case ap-
proach seeks to avoid.11
Additionally, a defendant is told from the start of a trial that all com-
munications with the court must be made through counsel. 1 ' In fact, a
defendant is not only prohibited from speaking openly in court but also is
threatened with swift punishment if he does. 112 To presume that a de-
fendant waives his right to testify by being silent, therefore, works un-
fairly against a well-behaved defendant who wishes to testify but who
obeys instructions and remains silent at trial.
Furthermore, defendants are often not acquainted with the intricacies
of courtroom procedure." 3 A defendant may not realize until jury delib-
eration that his time to testify has passed." 4 It is thus unfair to hold that
an uninformed defendant waives his right to testify by not making an
objection at the proper time." 5
defendant who does not testify is severely prejudiced); L. Mayers, Shall We Amend the
Fifth Amendment 21 (1959 and reprint 1978) (Gallup poll shows 71 per cent of those
interviewed would imply guilt from defendants failure to testify); Dolinko, Is There a
Rationale for the Privilege against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1063, 1075
(1986)("jurors are so likely to regard a defendant's failure to testify as evidence of guilt
that the innocent defendant [with prior convictions] is usually better off taking the
stand")(footnote omitted); Nichol, Prior Crime Impeachment of Criminal Defendants: A
ConstitutionalAnalysis of Rule 609, 82 W. Va. L. Rev. 391, 401 (1980) (jurors naturally
presume that defendant's are fearful of being shown to be liars under cross-examination);
Williams, The Trial of a Criminal Case, 29 N.Y. St. B. Bull. 36, 42 (1957) ("The fact of
the matter is that a defendant who does not take the stand does not in reality enjoy any
longer the presumption of innocence."); Robinson, The Defendant as Witness, 29 Dicta
266, 266 (1952) (a prejudicial presumption is bound to arise if the defendant does not
testify); Note, Character Evidence By Any Other Name...: A Proposal to Limit Impeach-
ment by Prior Conviction Under Rule 609, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 762, 762-63 (1990)
(jury almost inevitably draws inference of guilt from failure to take the stand).
110. See Caruley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 510-13 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 463-64 (1938).
111. See United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752, 759 (1lth Cir. 1990); United States v.
Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 770 (9th Cir. 1989)(Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
112. See Teague, 908 F.2d at 759; Martinez, 883 F.2d at 770 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
113. See Tigar, Forward: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1970); Teague, 908 F.2d at 759.
114. See Teague, 908 F.2d at 759. An example of this can be seen in the defendant's
testimony at a post-conviction hearing from United States v. DiSalvo, where the defend-
ant talked about the presentation of the defense:
So we get inside... And he called one witness to the stand .... And it never,
before I knew it, the defense rested. And that was it, and the case was over as
far as I was concerned. But I never, like I didn't know I could get up and say
wait a minute, your Honor, I want to say something ....
726 F. Supp. 596, 598 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (testimony of the defendant as reported in the
Magistrate's Report and Recommendation).
115. See United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752, 759 (11th Cir. 1990). As one com-
mentator stated: "It palters in a double sense, therefore, to admonish [the defendant] to
observe the arcane rituals of the courtroom and to entrust his future to the remote world
of judges and lawyers--only to discover at the end of the process that his rights have




The case-by-case approach also preserves the dignity of courtroom
proceedings. The American Bar Association notes that one frequently
criticized aspect of the criminal trial is the undignified atmosphere of the
courtroom.1 16 To ensure an appropriate setting for trials, courts demand
that the defendant be silent and that any communication with the court
be made through his attorney.17 The silent record approach, by de-
manding that a defendant disrupt the courtroom by making an on-the-
record objection to preserve his right to testify is thus antithetical to the
preservation of courtroom dignity. 18
Therefore, precedent, considerations of fairness and autonomy, and
preservation of courtroom dignity all dictate that the silent record ap-
proach be abandoned. At a minimum, a case-by-case approach should be
employed to ensure that a defendant's right to testify is protected from
unilateral waiver by his attorney.
IV. THE CASE FOR PROCEDURALLY SAFEGUARDING THE
CONSTirUTIONAL RIGHT TO TESTIFY
The case-by-case approach is not without its drawbacks. For instance,
it looks primarily to the defendant's intent, rather than his knowledge.
Accordingly, it does not directly address the defendant who is unaware
of his constitutional right to testify.119 It should be apparent that a per-
son without knowledge of the right to testify could not waive it know-
ingly. 20 Similarly, a case-by-case approach does not address the
defendant who does not realize that the ultimate decision of whether to
testify belongs to him rather than to his attorney.
116. See Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 42, Standard 6-1.1(b), at 6-6, com-
mentary at 6-8; see also Tigar, supra note 113, at 26 n.81 (problem of courtroom disrup-
tion is subject of renewed interest).
117. See Teague, 908 F.2d at 759.
118. As noted by the dissent, the Martinez holding "requires the defendant to...
interrupt the trial proceedings, and interject himself, uninvited, into the fray." United
States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 770 (9th Cir. 1989) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Fur-
thermore, once criminal defendants become aware that they must disrupt the court pro-
ceedings to preserve their right to testify, they may feel compelled to disrupt the court to
object to other decisions made by their attorneys with which they disagree. See Tigar,
supra note 113, at 27.
119. See. e.g., United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752, 761 (11th Cir. 1990)(limiting its
holding to cases where the attorney, against the defendant's will, waives the right to
testify); Galowski v. Murphy, 891 F.2d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 1989)(does not address the
question of whether a defendant without knowledge of the right can waive it).
120. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Edwards, 897 F.2d 445, cert. denied, I l lS.
CL 560 (1990), has held otherwise. See i. at 447. In Edwards, the defendant claimed he
was unaware of his right to testify and therefore claimed he could not knowingly waive it.
See id, at 446. While noting that Martinez stated that the defendant needed to know the
right existed in order to waive it, the court found that knowledge of the right to testify
was not necessary for its knowing and intentional waiver. See id. at 446-47. To find
otherwise, the court determined, would undermine Martinez' broad rule that a court had
no duty to inform the defendant of his right to testify. See it.
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Relying upon defense counsel to inform his client of the nature and
existence of his constitutional right to testify poses several significant
problems. First, an attorney who does not want his client to testify could
slant information to dissuade the defendant from testifying. 2' Second,
an incompetent or overworked attorney may simply not supply the infor-
mation necessary for the defendant to make an intelligent choice.' 22 Ad-
ditionally, through incompetency, the attorney himself may be unaware
of the right or may give incorrect information. 23 In any case, even if the
defense attorney accurately relays this information, there is no assurance
that counsel will not simply prevent a defendant from testifying even
though the defendant desires to testify.' 24
To ensure that a criminal defendant's right to testify is safeguarded,
trial judges should be given the responsibility for both informing the de-
fendant of this constitutional right and making a record of the defend-
ant's knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of this right. 125
Assigning this role to the trial judge is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent126 and such procedures are not foreign to trial courts. Indeed,
121. See, e.g., Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Argumentfor Autonomy, 65 N.C.L. Rev. 315, 342 (1987) (an attorney may "shade...
information to ensure that the client reaches the decision deemed appropriate by the
attorney").
122. See, e.g., United States v. DiSalvo 726 F. Supp. 596, 598 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (Magis-
trate concluded the defense attorney "did not advise [the defendant] of his right to testify
despite [the defendant's] having told him that he wanted to testify").
123. Several articles have addressed the high rate of the incompetency of defense coun-
sel. See, eg., Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certi-
fication of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 227, 240
(1973)(then Chief Justice Burger proposed certification of trial advocates to combat the
problem of incompetency); Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel-the Trial
Judge's Role, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 633-34 (1980)(incompetency of counsel is a growing
concern and it is up to the trial judge to monitor a defense attorney's competence);
Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Va. L. Rev. 761, 796
(1989)("[a]ppointed counsel are... often of poor quality"). See also DiSalvo, 726 F.
Supp. at 598 (defense attorney did not provide defendant with information necessary to
make a meaningful choice as to whether to testify).
124. This is what happened in Teague. The defense attorney had informed the defend-
ant of his right to testify and that it was his decision to make. Even though the defendant
repeatedly told his attorney that he wanted to testify, however, the attorney rested the
defense without calling him as a witness or consulting him. See United States v. Teague,
908 F.2d 752, 760 (11th Cir. 1990). The court found this to violate the defendant's con-
stitutional right to testify. See id. at 761.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct state "the lawyer shall abide by the client's
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to... whether the client will testify."
Model Rules, supra note 42, at Rule 1.2(a). Provisions similar to the Model Rules were
in effect in the Martinez case, yet this did not stop the defendant's attorney from unilater-
ally keeping the defendant off the stand. See United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750,
755 (9th Cir. 1989).
125. Judge Schwarzer stated in a recent article that where a right requires a knowing,
voluntary and intelligent waiver, "[t]he judge has a duty to conduct a hearing to satisfy
himself... that the waiver is the product of the defendant's decision." See Schwarzer,
supra note 123, at 657.
126. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) ("[t]he constitutional right
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the Supreme Court has required an on-the-record waiver in cases where
the right involved requires a knowing, voluntarily and intelligent waiver
at the time of trial.127 This has been found necessary for the waiver of
right to counsel, 128 right to trial129 and right to trial by jury. 130
Additionally, the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal
Justice squarely place the responsibility for safeguarding the rights of the
criminal defendant on the shoulders of the trial judge.' 3' Commentators
have also approved of the trend to place increased responsibility on trial
judges to ensure fair trials for criminal defendants. 32 Furthermore, judi-
cial efficiency is promoted by requiring trial courts to advise the defend-
ant of his right to testify and to elicit an on-the-record waiver when a
defendant does not testify. Such advisement and inquiry provides an ap-
pellate court with a strong evidentiary basis for determining whether the
"knowing, voluntary and intelligent" standard was met.'33 Additionally,
a defendant would have little room left to assert that his right to testify
of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial
court").
127. See e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)(right to counsel); Carnley
v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962)(same); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465
(1938)(same); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)(right to trial); Adams v.
United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277-78 (1942)(trial by jury).
128. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516; Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 465.
129. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242.
130. See Adams, 317 U.S. 277-78. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a
written waiver by a defendant to waive his right to a jury trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
23(a); see also United States v. David, 511 F.2d 355, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (written waiver
under Rule 23(a) not always enough to insure competent waiver, some cases require an
on-the-record discussion to ensure constitutional standard of waiver is met).
131. See Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 42, Standard 6-1.1, at 6 ("[t]he
trial judge has the responsibility for safeguarding... the rights of the accused").
132. See generally Remington, The Changing Role of the Trial Judge in Criminal
Cases--Ensuring that the Sixth Amendment Right to Assistance of Counsel is Effective, 20
U.C.D.L. Rev. 339, 351 (1987) (arguing that judges must take proactive role in ensuring
effective assistance of counsel); Schwarzer, supra note 123, at 651-65 (urging intervention
by trial judge to ensure that attorneys represent their clients competently).
133. See United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 767-68 (9th Cir. 1989)(Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting). See also People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 515 (Colo. 1984) (purpose of advise-
ment includes facilitating appellate review); LaVigne v. State, 788 P.2d 52, 55 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1990) ("the case at bar and the cases which we have consulted in our attempt to
resolve this issue point out a serious problem: if the court does not establish on the
record that the defendant has waived his right to testify, it is extremely difficult to deter-
mine ... whether such a waiver occurred").
The court in Martinez lists seven reasons, culled from other cases, why courts should
have no duty to make an on-the-record determination as to whether the defendant in a
criminal trial has knowingly and intentionally waived his right to testify. See United
States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 760 (9th Cir. 1989). Three of these reasons implicitly
rest on the assumption that the right to testify is not a constitutional right and therefore
may be unilaterally waived by counsel.
One reason is that "the right to testify is... the kind of right that must be asserted in
order to be recognized." Id The court, for this proposition, relies on cases which sug-
gest that the right to testify on one's own behalf is merely a statutory "privilege" which
can be taken away at the whim of Congress, not a fundamental and personal constitu-
tional right. See United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 939-40 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated, 421
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was violated, if its waiver were on-the-record. Moreover, this would
avoid attorney-client complicity in seeking a new trial. 34
In People v. Curtis,1 35 the Colorado Supreme Court adopted such a
procedure. The court in Curtis held it to be necessary for the trial court
to advise the criminal defendant of his right to testify and ensure that the
defendant has made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of this
right. 1 36 The Colorado experience is noteworthy, particularly concern-
U.S. 944 (1975). This reasoning does not withstand constitutional scrutiny. See supra
notes 39, 86-93 and accompanying text.
Another reason is that in "advising a defendant [a court] might improperly intrude on
the attorney-client relation". Martinez, 883 F.2d at 760. It is, however, the responsibility
of a trial judge, irrespective of defense counsel, to ensure that rights that require the
defendant's personal consent to be waived are protected. See supra notes 131-32 and
accompanying text. Additionally, inquiries into the waiver of other fundamental rights
have not been found to impinge unnecessarily on the attorney-client relation. See Marti-
nez, 883 F.2d at 767 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).
A third reason is that "the judge should not interfere with defense strategy." Id. at
760. The right to testify, however, is held by federal courts to be a constitutional right so
fundamental that its waiver is not a matter for defense strategy. See supra notes 41-44
and accompanying text. A judge engaging in such inquiry is properly following Ameri-
can Bar Association standards. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. As Judge
Reinhardt points out, "[t]he defense strategy, in regards to the decision to testify, is ulti-
mately shaped by the defendant. The discussion between trial court and defendant would
assist, not interfere with, that decision." Martinez, 883 F.2d at 767 (Reinhardt, J., dis-
senting).
The remaining four grounds posited by the Martinez court for not procedurally safe-
guarding a defendant's right to testify are not compelling. One is that "it is important
that the decision to testify be made at the time of trial and that the failure to testify not be
raised as an afterthought after conviction." Id. at 760. This statement does not with-
stand close scrutiny. If a proper inquiry were made, it would ensure that defendant's
decision to testify was made at the time of trial. See id. at 766 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
Second, the court notes that "by advising the defendant of his right to testify, the court
could influence the defendant to waive his right not to testify." Id. at 760 (emphasis in
original). An adequate advisement, however, would inform a defendant of his right not
to testify as well as the consequences of taking the stand. See id. at 766-67 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting). Further, the advisement and inquiry would be attended by counsel, thus
ameliorating its effect on the defendant's fifth amendment privilege. See id.
Third, the majority expresses its concern that an inquiry "would introduce error into
the trial." Id. at 760. In fact, such an advisement and inquiry would diminish the chance
of error, as there would be "a strong evidentiary basis for the trial court's rulings." Id. at
767 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); accord, LaVigne v. State, 788 P.2d 52, 55 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1990).
Finally, the majority expresses its concern over the correct timing of such an inquiry,
opining that the point at which the defense rests is "not an opportune moment to conduct
a colloquy". Martinez, 883 F.2d at 760. These concerns can be allayed by establishing a
procedure for an advisement and inquiry. The advisement could be conducted before
trial and an inquiry done after the defense rests. See infra notes 141-43 and accompany-
ing text; see also Martinez, 883 F.2d at 767 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("when the defense
rests is a perfectly appropriate-as well as an administratively convenient-time to con-
duct the colloquy").
134. Under this scenario, an unscrupulous attorney would offer evidence that he
waived, against his client's will, his client's right to testify in order to secure a new trial.
135. 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984).
136. See iL at 515. Other states have adopted similar views. See, e.g., State v.
Neuman, 371 S.E.2d 77, 82 (W. Va. 1988)(adopting Curtis procedure for West Virginia);
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ing the scope and timing of the advisement and inquiry.
As to the scope of the advisement, the Colorado Supreme Court rec-
ommended that the trial court advise the defendant that he has the right
to testify, that the ultimate decision of whether to testify is his, that by
testifying he will likely be cross-examined, and that any prior convictions
may be used to impeach his testimony. 37 Because of the advisory nature
of the Curtis instructions, however, trial courts in Colorado have not
been uniform in advising the defendant. 3 Additionally, the Curtis opin-
ion does not mention whether the court should inform the defendant of
his right not to testify. 139 This right, however, should be included in any
instruction to fairly balance the trial court's advice and to avoid unduly
influencing the defendant to waive this right."
The Curtis opinion offers trial courts little guidance regarding the tim-
ing of the advisement. Indeed, the court does not mention a specific time
to conduct the advisement and'inquiry.14' In a footnote to a later case,
however, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that the appropriate time
for an advisement and inquiry would be "at the time [the] defendant
chooses not to testify." 42 Presumably, this is when the defense rests. At
least one trial court in Colorado, however, advised the defendant of his
right to testify prior to the end of the prosecution's case and this was
deemed sufficient to satisfy the Curtis requirement.1 43
Culberson v. State, 412 So. 2d 1184, 1186-87 (Miss. 1982)(adopting similar procedures
for purposes of judicial efficiency); accord LaVigne v. State, 788 P.2d 52, 55 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1990)("It appears... that the only clear way to establish whether the defendant is
waiving his right to testify is to require trial judges to establish on the record that the
defendant understands his right to testify and is waiving that right.")
137. See Curtis 681 P.2d at 514.
A trial court [should advise] the defendant outside the presence of the jury that
he has a right to testify, that if he wants to testify then no one can prevent him
from doing so, that if he testifies the prosecution will be allowed to cross-ex-
amine him, that if he has been convicted of a felony the prosecutor will be
entitled to ask him about it and thereby disclose it to the jury, and that if the
felony conviction is disclosed to the jury then the jury can be instructed to
consider it only as it bears upon his credibility.
Id
138. See e.g., People v. Woodward, 782 P.2d 1212, 1213 (Colo. CL App. 1989)
(although trial court advised defendant of right to testify, it did not advise defendant that
the decision to testify was his to make); People v. McMullen, 738 P.2d 23 (Colo. Ct. App.
1986) (defendant claimed trial court failed to warn him of disadvantages of testifying).
139. See Curtis, 681 P.2d at 514-15. Thus, in a later case, the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado was faced with the issue of whether by not advising the defendant of his right not to
testify that this right had been violated. See People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117, 122 (Colo.
1986). The court decided that, even though the right not to testify must be knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily waived, the lack of an on-the-record advisement and deter-
mination of waiver concerning this right "will not automatically render a defendant's
waiver [of this right] invalid." Id at 124.
140. See United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 766-67 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).
141. See People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514-17 (Colo. 1984).
142. Mozee, 723 P.2d at 125 n.8.
143. See People v. Roelker, 780 P.2d 17, 18 (Colo. CL App. 1989), aff'd, 804 P.2d
1336 (Colo. 1991). The Colorado Supreme Court, in affirming Roelker, limited Curtis to
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To avoid confusion and ensure that a defendant's waiver of his right to
testify is knowing, voluntary and intelligent, a two-part colloquy is advis-
able. The first part should be on the record, prior to the beginning of
evidence and outside the hearing of the jury. It should inform the de-
fendant of his constitutional rights both to testify and not to testify and
the consequences of invoking either right. The content of the advisement
should be consistent in order to avoid appellate claims alleging a viola-
tion of the right to testify based on the insufficiency of the trial court's
advice.'" It should be done before the trial so the defendant has an in-
formed basis, as the trial progresses, for deciding whether it is in his best
interest to take the stand. This pre-trial discussion would also encourage
defense counsel to discuss the decision more fully with the defendant. To
this end, it is recommended that a fixed litany, based on the suggestions
of the Curtis court,1 45 but including mention of the right not to testify,
should be established."
The second part of the colloquy should occur after the defense has
rested if the defendant has not been called to testify on his own behalf.
This should also be on the record and out of the jury's hearing. The
judge should question the defendant to determine whether there was a
knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to testify.
CONCLUSION
The silent record approach to the waiver of the constitutional right to
testify should be abandoned because it is contrary to the standard for the
waiver of constitutionally protected rights of criminal defendants. Such
requiring that a trial court merely advise the defendant of his right to testify. See Roelker
v. People, 804 P.2d 1336, 1338-39 (Colo. 1991) Thus, the court held that no inquiry was
necessary when determining whether the defendant made a knowing, voluntary and intel-
figent waiver. See id at 1339. The court then employed a silent record approach to
determine if the defendant had waived his right to testify noting that "[the defendant] did
not make any objection when his attorney said, on the record, that the defense was not
going to present any evidence." Id For a discussion of the flaws of the silent record
approach, see supra notes 89-121 and accompanying text. The opinion in Roelker was
written by Justice Erickson who dissented in Curtis on the grounds that the right to
testify is not a fundamental constitutional right and, therefore, can be unilaterally waived
by counsel. See Curtis, 681 P.2d at 517-19 (Erickson, C.J., dissenting).
144. See, e.g., People v. Woodward, 782 P.2d 1212, 1213 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989)
(although trial court advised defendant of right to testify, it did not advise defendant that
the decision to testify was defendant's to make); People v. McMullen, 738 P.2d 23 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1986) (trial court failed to warn defendant of disadvantages of testifying).
145. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
146. The following is an example of a model advisement:
You have the constitutional right to testify on your own behalf. You also have
the right not to testify. If you choose to testify, any prior felony convictions
may be brought to the attention of the jury. Also, if you testify the prosecutor
will be allowed to cross-examine you. If you choose not to testify, the jury may
be told not to draw any adverse inferences from such choice. You should dis-
cuss your options with your attorney and listen carefully to his/her advice. The
ultimate choice on whether or not to testify, however, is yours.
The judge should then question the defendant to see if he understands the advice.
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approach is also inconsistent with considerations of fairness, autonomy
and courtroom dignity. At a minimum, courts should adopt a case-by-
case approach to determine whether a defendant has waived his constitu-
tional right to testify.
In order to best ensure protection of this right, however, trial judges
should procedurally safeguard it by advising the criminal defendant of
his right to testify and, if the defendant is not called to testify, an on-the-
record waiver should be elicited. This procedural safeguard is an efficient
and effective means for ensuring that the defendant's right to testify will
not be violated.
Reed Harvey

